Introduction
The Mobile IP working group set out to explore the problem and solution spaces of IPsec and Mobile IP coexistence. The problem statement and solution requirements for Mobile IPv4 case was first documented in [1] . The current version of this document outlines the proposed solution for IPv4.
The document contains two parts: o a basic solution which is an applicability statement of Mobile IPv4 and IPsec to provide session mobility between enterprise Intranets and other external networks, intended for enterprise mobile users; and o a technical specification and a set of requirements for secure detection of the internal and the external networks.
There are many useful ways to combine Mobile IPv4 and IPsec. The solution specified in this document is most applicable when the assumption documented in the problem statement [1] Enterprise mobile users benefit from unrestricted seamless session mobility between subnets, regardless of whether the subnets are part of the internal or the external network. Unfortunately the current Mobile IPv4 and IPsec standards alone do not provide such a service [11] .
The proposed solution is to use standard Mobile IPv4 when the mobile node is in the internal network, and to use the VPN tunnel endpoint address for the Mobile IPv4 registration when outside. IPsec-based VPN tunnels require re-negotiation after movement. To overcome this limitation, another layer of Mobile IPv4 is used underneath IPsec, in effect making IPsec unaware of movement. Thus, the mobile node can freely move in the external network without disrupting the VPN connection.
Briefly, when outside, the mobile node:
o detects that it is outside (Section 3); o registers its co-located or foreign agent care-of address with the external home agent;
o establishes a VPN tunnel using e.g. IKE (or IKEv2) if security associations are not already available;
o registers the VPN tunnel address as its co-located care-of address with the internal home agent; this registration request is sent inside the IPsec tunnel.
The solution requires control over the protocol layers in the mobile node. It must be capable of (1) detecting whether it is inside or outside in a secure fashion, and (2) control the protocol layers accordingly. For instance, if the mobile node is inside, the IPsec layer needs to become dormant.
Current Mobile IPv4 and IPsec standards, when used in a suitable combination, are sufficient to implement the solution; no changes are required to existing VPN devices, home agents, or foreign agents.
Scope
This document describes a solution for IPv4 only. The downside of the described approach is that an external home agent is required, and that the packet overhead (see Section 5) Other types of VPNs are out of scope.
Related work
Related work has been done on Mobile IPv6 in [12] which discusses the interaction of IPsec and Mobile IPv6 in protecting Mobile IPv6 signaling. The draft also discusses dynamic updating of the IPsec endpoint based on Mobile IP signaling packets.
The "transient pseudo-NAT" attack, described in [13] and [6] , affects any approach which attempts to provide security of mobility signaling in conjunction with NAT devices. In many cases, one cannot assume any co-operation from NAT devices which thus have to be treated as any other networking entity.
The IETF MOBIKE working group is defining a mechanism to provide mobility for IPsec. This would allow the external Mobile IPv4 layer described in this specification to be removed. However, deploying MOBIKE requires changes to VPN devices, and is thus out of scope of this specification. The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [2] .
Assumptions and rationale
The proposed solution is an attempt to solve the problem described in [1] . The major assumptions and their rationale is summarized below.
Changes to existing firewall and VPN deployments should be minimized: o Note, however, that the assumption (no encryption when inside) does not necessarily apply to all solutions in the solution space; if the abovementioned problems were resolved there is no fundamental reason why encryption could not be applied when inside.
Why IPsec lacks mobility
IPsec, as currently specified [3] requires that a new IKE negotiation be done whenever an IPsec peer moves, i.e. changes care-of address.
The main reason is that a security association is uni-directional and identified by a triplet consisting of (1) the destination address (which is the outer address when tunnel mode is used), (2) the security protocol (ESP or AH), and (3) the Security Parameter Index (SPI) ( [3] , Section 4.1). Although an implementation is not required to use all of these for its own SAs, an implementation cannot assume that a peer does not.
When a mobile IPsec peer sends packets to a stationary IPsec peer, there is no problem; the SA is "owned" by the stationary IPsec peer, and therefore the destination address does not need to change. The (outer) source address should be ignored by the stationary peer (although some implementations do check the source address as well).
The problem arises when packets are sent from the stationary peer to the mobile peer. The destination address of this SA (SAs are unidirectional) is established during IKE negotiation, and is effectively the care-of address of the mobile peer at time of negotiation. Therefore the packets will be sent to the original care-of address, not a changed care-of address.
The IPsec NAT traversal mechanism can also be used for limited mobility, but UDP tunneling needs to be used even when there is no NAT in the route between the mobile and the stationary peers. Furthermore, support for changes in current NAT mapping is not required by the NAT traversal specification (draft) [8] .
In summary, although the IPsec standard does not as such prevent mobility (in the sense of updating security associations on-the-fly), there is no standardized mechanism (explicit or implicit) for doing so. Therefore it is assumed throughout this document that any change in the addresses comprising the identity of an SA requires IKE renegotiation, which implies too heavy computation and too large latency for useful mobility. Enterprise users will access both the internal and external networks using different networking technologies. In some networks, the MN will use FAs and in others it will anchor at the HA using co-located mode. The following figure describes an example network topology illustrating the relationship between the internal and external networks, the possible locations of the mobile node (i.e. (MN)).
In every possible location described in the figure, the mobile node can establish a connection to the corresponding HA(s) by using a suitable "access mode". An access mode is here defined to consist of: This notation is more useful when optimizations to protocol layers are considered. The notation is preserved here so that work on the optimizations can refer to a common notation.
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Figure: Basic topology, possible MN locations and access modes
The internal network is typically a multi-subnetted network using private addressing [7] . Subnets may contain internal home agent(s), DHCP server(s), and/or foreign agent(s). Current IEEE 802.11 wireless LANs are typically deployed in the external network or the DMZ because of security concerns.
The figure leaves out a few details worth noticing:
o There may be multiple NAT devices anywhere in the diagram.
* When the MN is outside, the NAT devices may be placed between the MN and the x-HA or the x-HA and the VPN.
* There may be also be NAT(s) between the VPN and the i-HA, or a NAT integrated into the VPN. In essence, any router in the figure may be considered to represent zero or more routers, each possibly performing NAT and/or ingress filtering. o The figure represents a topology where each functional entity is illustrated as a separate device. However, it is possible that several network functions are co-located in a single device. In fact, all three server components (x-HA, VPN, and i-HA) may be colocated in a single physical device.
The following issues are also important when considering enterprise mobile users:
o Some firewalls are configured to block ICMP messages and/or fragments. Such firewalls (routers) cannot be detected reliably.
o Some networks contain transparent application proxies, especially for the HTTP protocol. Like firewalls, such proxies cannot be detected reliably in general. IPsec and Mobile IPv4 are incompatible with such networks.
Whenever a mobile node obtains either a co-CoA or a FA-CoA, the following conceptual steps take place:
o The mobile node detects whether the subnet where the care-of address was obtained belongs to the internal or the external network using the method described in Section 3 (or a vendor specific mechanism fulfilling the requirements described). Note that these two tasks are intertwined to some extent: detection of the internal network results in a successful registration to the i-HA using the proposed network detection algorithm. An improved network detection mechanism not based on Mobile IPv4 registration messages might not have this side-effect.
The following subsections describe the different access modes and the requirements for registration and connection setup phase. This access mode is standard Mobile IPv4 [5] with a co-located address, except that:
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o the mobile node MUST detect that it is in the internal network; and o the mobile node MUST re-register periodically (with a configurable interval) to ensure it is still inside the internal network (see Section 4).
Access mode: 'f'
This access mode is standard Mobile IPv4 [5] with a foreign agent care-of address, except that o the mobile node MUST detect that it is in the internal network; and o the mobile node MUST re-register periodically (with a configurable interval) to ensure it is still inside the internal network (see Section 4).
Access mode: 'cvc'
Steps: 
Internal network detection
Secure detection of the internal network is critical to prevent plaintext traffic from being sent over an untrusted network. In other words, the overall security (confidentiality and integrity of user data) relies on the security of the internal network detection mechanism in addition to IPsec. For this reason, security requirements are described in this section.
In addition to detecting entry into the internal network, the mobile node must also detect when it has left the internal network. Entry into the internal network is easier security-wise: the mobile node can ensure that it is inside the internal network before sending any plaintext traffic. Exit from the internal network is more difficult to detect, and the MN may accidentally leak plaintext packets if the event is not detected in time. Whether the mobile node can detect such changes in the current connection reliably depends on the implementation and the networking technlogy. For instance, some mobile nodes may be implemented as pure layer three entities. Even if the mobile node software has access to layer two information, such information is not trustworthy security-wise, and depends on the network interface driver.
If the mobile node does not detect these events properly, it may leak plaintext traffic into an untrusted network. A number of approaches can be used to detect exit from the internal network, ranging from frequent re-registration to the use of layer two information.
A mobile node MUST implement a detection mechanism fulfilling the requirements described in Section 3.2; this ensures that basic security requirements are fulfilled. The basic algorithm described in Section 3.3 is one way to do that, but alternative methods may be used instead or in conjunction. The assumptions that the requirements and the proposed mechanism rely upon are described in Section 3. The firewall MUST be configured to block traffic originating from external networks going to the i-HA. In other words, if the mobile node succeeds in registering with the i-HA directly (without using IPsec), the mobile node may safely infer that it is connected to the trusted internal network, and may therefore send plaintext traffic on that particular network interface.
The firewall MAY be configured to block registration traffic to the x-HA originating from within the internal network, which makes the network detection algorithm simpler and more robust. However, as the registration request is basically UDP traffic, an ordinary firewall (even a stateful one) would typically allow the registration request to be sent, and a registration reply to be received through the firewall.
Implementation requirements
Any mechanism used to detect the internal network MUST fulfill the following requirements. through that particular interface and the connection status of the interface has not changed since.
Registration-based internal network monitoring
Some leak of plaintext packets to a (potentially) untrusted network cannot always be completely prevented; this depends heavily on the client implementation. In some cases the client cannot detect such a change, e.g. if upstream routing is changed.
More frequent re-registrations when the MN is inside is a simple way to ensure that MN is still inside. The MN SHOULD start reregistration every (T_MONITOR -N) seconds when inside, where N is a grace period which ensures that re-registration is completed before T_MONITOR seconds are up. To bound the maximum amount of time that a plaintext leak may persist, the mobile node must fulfill the following security requirements when inside:
o The mobile node MUST NOT send or receive a user data packet if more than T_MONITOR seconds has elapsed since last successful (re-)registration with the i-HA.
o If more than T_MONITOR seconds has elapsed, data packets MUST be either dropped or queued. If the packets are queued, the queues MUST NOT be processed until the re-registration has been successfully completed without a connection status change.
o The T_MONITOR parameter MUST be configurable, and have the default value of 60 seconds. This default is a trade-off between traffic overhead and a reasonable bound to exposure.
This approach is reasonable for a wide range of mobile nodes (e.g. laptops), but has unnecessary overhead when the mobile node is idle (not sending or receiving packets). If re-registration does not complete before T_MONITOR seconds are up, data packets must be queued or dropped as specified above. Note that re-registration packets MUST be sent even if bi-directional user data traffic is being relayed: data packets are no substitute for an authenticated reregistration.
To minimize traffic overhead when the mobile node is idle, reregistrations can be stopped when no traffic is being sent or received. If the mobile node subsequently receives or needs to send a packet, the packet must be dropped or queued (as specified above) until a re-registration with the i-HA has been successfully completed. Although this approach adds packet processing complexity, it may be appropriate for small battery powered devices which may be idle much of the time. T_MONITOR is required to be configurable so that an administrator can determine the required security level for the particular deployment.
Configuring T_MONITOR in the order of few seconds is not practical; alternative mechanisms need to be considered if such confidence is required.
The re-registration mechanism is a worst case fallback mechanism. If additional information (such as layer two triggers) are available to the mobile node, the mobile node SHOULD use the triggers to detect MN movement and restart the detection process to minimize exposure.
Note that re-registration is required by Mobile IPv4 by default (except for the untypical case of an infinite binding lifetime); however, the re-registration interval may be much larger when using an ordinary Mobile IPv4 client. Shorter re-registration interval is usually not an issue, because the internal network is typically a fast, wired network, and the shortened re-registration interval applies only when the mobile node is inside the internal network. When outside, the ordinary Mobile IPv4 re-registration process (based on binding lifetime) is used.
Proposed algorithm
When the MN detects that it has changed its point of network attachment on a certain interface, it issues two simultaneous registration requests, one to the i-HA and another to the x-HA. These registration requests are periodically retransmitted if reply messages are not received.
Registration replies are processed as follows:
o If a response from the x-HA is received, the MN stops retransmitting its registration request to the x-HA and tentatively determines it is outside. However, the MN MUST keep on retransmitting its registration to the i-HA for a period of time. The MN MAY postpone the IPsec connection setup for some period of time while it waits for a (possible) response from the i-HA.
o If a response from the i-HA is received, the MN MUST determine that it is inside. If a previous registration reply from the x-HA has been received, the MN SHOULD de-register with the x-HA. In any case, the MN MUST stop retransmitting its registration requests to both i-HA and x-HA. o If a response from the x-HA is received while the MN has successfully registered with the i-HA, the MN SHOULD de-register with the x-HA.
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If the MN ends up detecting that it is inside, it MUST re-register periodically (regardless of binding lifetime); see Section 3.2.3. If the re-registration fails, the MN MUST stop sending and receiving plaintext traffic, and MUST restart the detection algorithm.
Plaintext re-registration messages are always addressed either to the x-HA or the i-HA, not to both. This is because the MN knows, after initial registration, whether it is inside or outside. (However, when the mobile node is outside, it re-registers independently with the x-HA using plaintext, and with the i-HA through the VPN tunnel.)
Postponing the IPSec connection setup could prevent aborted IKE sessions. Aborting IKE sessions may be a problem in some cases because IKE does not provide a reliable, standardized, and mandatoryto-implement mechanism for terminating a session cleanly.
If the x-HA is not reachable from inside (i.e. the firewall configuration is known), a detection period of zero is preferred, as it minimizes connection setup overhead and causes no timing problems. Should the assumption have been invalid and a response from the i-HA received after a response from the x-HA, the MN SHOULD re-register with the i-HA directly.
Implementation issues
When the MN uses a parallel detection algorithm and is using an FA, the MN sends two registration requests through the same FA with the same MAC address (or equivalent) and possibly even the same home address. Although this is not in conflict with existing specifications, it is an unusual scenario; hence some FA implementations may not work properly in such a situation. However, testing against deployed foreign agents seems to indicate that a majority of available foreign agents handle this situation.
When the x-HA and i-HA addresses are the same, the scenario is even more difficult for the FA, and it is almost certain that existing FAs do not deal with the situation correctly. Therefore, it is required that x-HA and i-HA addresses MUST be different. For instance, if the MN has reason to believe it is inside, it MAY postpone sending of registration request to the x-HA for some time.
Similarly, if the MN has a reason to believe it is outside, it may start IPsec connection setup immediately after receiving a registration reply from the x-HA. However, should the MN receive a registration reply from the i-HA after IPsec connection setup has been started, the MN SHOULD still switch to using the i-HA directly.
Rationale for design choices

Firewall configuration requirements
The requirement that the i-HA cannot be reached from the external network is necessary. If not, a successful registration with the i-HA (without IPsec) cannot be used as a secure indication that the mobile node is inside. A possible solution to the obvious security problem would be to define and deploy a secure internal network detection mechanism based on e.g. signed FA advertisement or signed DHCP messages.
However, unless the mechanism is defined for both FA and DHCP messages and is deployed in every internal network, it has limited applicability. In other words, the mobile node MUST NOT assume it is in the internal network unless it receives a signed FA or DHCP message (regardless of whether it can register directly with the i-HA or not!). If it receives an unsigned FA or DHCP message, it MUST use IPsec; otherwise the mobile node can be easily tricked into using plaintext.
Assuming that all FA and DHCP servers in the internal network are upgraded to support such a feature does not seem realistic; it is highly desirable to be able to take advantage of existing DHCP and FA deployments. Similar analysis seems to apply regardless of what kind of additional security mechanism is defined.
Registration-based internal network monitoring
This issue also affects IPsec client security. However, as IPsec specifications take no stand on how and when the client applies IPsec, the issue is out of scope for IPsec. Because this document describes an algorithm and requirements for (secure) internal network detection, the issue is in scope of the document.
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The current requirement for internal network monitoring was added as a fallback mechanism.
No encryption when inside
If encryption was applied also when MN was inside, there would be no security reason to monitor the internal network periodically.
The main rationale for why encryption cannot be applied when the MN is inside was given in Section 1.6. In short, the main issues are (1) power consumption; (2) extra CPU load, especially because internal networks are typically switched networks and a lot of data may be routinely transferred; (3) existing HA devices do not typically integrate IPsec functionality; (4) (IPsec) encryption requires user authentication, which may be interactive in some cases (e.g. SecurID) and thus a usability issue; and (5) user may need to have separate credentials for VPN devices in the DMZ and the HA.
Improvements
The registration process can be improved in many ways. One simple way is to make the x-HA detect whether a registration request came from inside or outside. If it came from inside, the x-HA can simply drop the registration request.
This approach is feasible without protocol changes in scenarios where a corporation owns both the VPN and the x-HA. The x-HA can simply determine based on incoming interface identifier (or the router which relayed the packet) whether the registration request came from inside or not.
In other scenarios protocol changes may be needed. Such changes are out of scope of this document. The mobile node MUST support access modes: c, f, cvc, fvc (Section 2).
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The mobile node SHOULD support Mobile IPv4 NAT traversal [6] for both internal and external Mobile IP.
The mobile node SHOULD support IPsec NAT traversal [8] [9] .
When the mobile node has direct access to the i-HA, it SHOULD use only the inner Mobile IPv4 layer to minimize firewall and VPN impact.
VPN device requirements
The VPN security policy MUST allow communication using UDP to the internal home agent(s), with home agent port 434 and any remote port. The security policy SHOULD allow IP-IP to internal home agent(s) in addition to UDP port 434.
The VPN device SHOULD implement the IPsec NAT traversal mechanism described in [8] [9] .
Home agent requirements
The home agent SHOULD implement the Mobile IPv4 NAT traversal mechanism described in [6] . (This also refers to the i-HA: NAT traversal is required to support VPNs that NAT VPN tunnel addresses or block IP-IP traffic.) 
Analysis
This section provides a comparison against guidelines described in Section 6 of the problem statement [1] and additional analysis of packet overhead with and without the optional mechanisms. 
Comparison against guidelines
Security implications
o The solution requires a new mechanism to detect whether the mobile node is in the internal or the external network. The security of this mechanism is critical in ensuring that the security level provided by IPsec is not compromised by a faulty detection mechanism.
o When the mobile node is outside, the external Mobile IPv4 layer may allow some traffic redirection attacks that plain IPsec does not allow. Other than that, IPsec security is unchanged.
o More security considerations are described in Section 6.
Packet overhead
The maximum packet overhead depends on access mode as follows: When the MN is outside, the situation is slightly different. Initial connection setup latency essentially consists of (1) registration with the x-HA, (2) optional detection delay (waiting for i-HA response), (3) IPsec connection setup (IKE), (4) registration with the i-HA. All but (4) are in addition to standard MIPv4.
However, handovers in the external network have performance comparable to standard MIPv4. The MN simply re-registers with the x-HA and starts to send IPsec traffic to the VPN gateway from the new address.
The MN may minimize latency by (1) When the VPN-TIA is registered as a co-located care-of address with the i-HA, all mobile node traffic appears as IP-IP for the firewall. Typically firewalls do not continue inspection beyond the IP-IP tunnel, but it is not inconceivable that some firewalls may do that.
In summary, the firewall must allow traffic coming from and going into the IPsec connection to be routed, even though they may not have successfully tracked the connection state. How this is done is out of scope of this document.
Intrusion detection systems (IDSs)
Many firewalls incorporate intrusion detection systems monitoring network traffic for unusual patterns and clear signs of attack.
Since traffic from a mobile node implementing this specification is UDP to i-HA port 434, and possibly IP-IP traffic to the i-HA address, existing IDSs may treat the traffic differently than ordinary VPN remote access traffic. Like firewalls, IDSs are not standardized, so it is impossible to guarantee interoperability with any particular IDS system.
Implementation of mobile node
Implementation of the mobile node requires the use of three tunneling layers, which may be used in various configurations depending on whether that particular interface is inside or outside. Note that it is possible that one interface is inside and another interface is outside, which requires a different layering for each interface at If the mobile node by mistake believes it is in the internal network and sends plaintext packets, it compromises IPsec security. For this reason, the overall security (confidentiality and integrity) of user data is a minimum of (1) IPsec security, and (2) security of the internal network detection mechanism.
Security of the internal network detection relies on a successful registration with the i-HA. For standard Mobile IPv4 [5] this means HMAC-MD5 and Mobile IPv4 replay protection.
When the connection status of an interface changes, an interface previously connected to the trusted internal network may suddenly be connected to an untrusted network. Although the same problem is also relevant to IPsec-based VPN implementations, the problem is especially relevant in the scope of this specification.
In most cases, mobile node implementations are expected to have layer two information available, making connection change detection both fast and robust. To cover cases where such information is not available (or fails for some reason), the mobile node is required to periodically re-register with the internal home agent to verify that it is still connected to the trusted network. It is also required that this re-registration interval be configurable, thus giving the administrator a parameter by which potential exposure may be controlled. The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed to pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in this document or the extent to which any license under such rights might or might not be available; nor does it represent that it has made any independent effort to identify any such rights. Information on the procedures with respect to rights in RFC documents can be found in BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Copies of IPR disclosures made to the IETF Secretariat and any assurances of licenses to be made available, or the result of an attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the use of such proprietary rights by implementers or users of this specification can be obtained from the IETF on-line IPR repository at http://www.ietf.org/ipr.
The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary rights that may cover technology that may be required to implement this standard. Please address the information to the IETF at ietf-ipr@ietf.org.
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